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INTRODUCTION

In the United States today, amateur sports are widely viewed, in definitional
terms, as inferior to their professional counterparts. Amateur athletes are
typically either those, like the best college football and basketball players, who
are perfecting their skills so that they can take their game to the “next level”—
i.e., professional—or they are competitors who simply are not and never will be
good enough to compete with the very best in their game.
As historians of sport know, this was not always the case. Prior to World
War II, for example, professional football did not receive the kind of respect and
media attention the college game did. Admittedly, from at least the time of Henry
Beach Needham’s 1905 expose in McClure’s Magazine and the Carnegie
Foundation’s 1929 report, and at periodic intervals thereafter, critics
demonstrated that college football was far less respectable and less genuinely
amateur than its defenders imagined.1 Even today, sports like swimming and
gymnastics lack professional circuits that can outshine top amateur competition.
Another significant exception to the perceived inferiority of amateur sports
was found in international ice hockey, especially during the 1970s and 1980s.
For historical reasons explained in more detail below, amateur and professional
hockey developed in very different ways. To oversimplify, the professional
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See JOHN SAYLE WATTERSON, COLLEGE FOOTBALL: HISTORY, SPECTACLE, CONTROVERSY 66–68,
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game, played in North America, placed more of a premium on body-checking
and physical play, while the amateur variant, which developed largely in
Europe, typically emphasized passing, stickhandling, and puck possession.
While it was impossible for years to hold meaningful contests matching top
professionals and amateurs, a series of rule changes and political developments
between 1969 and 1972 broke down barriers between the amateur and
professional versions of the game, and permitted unprecedented new
competitions.2 When the world’s best amateurs started playing the world’s top
professionals, the amateurs held their own. In fact, this article will argue that in
hockey, the amateur game was often the more skilled version. This reality has
been obscured by Cold War politics and the ideological rivalry that
overshadowed much international competition in the 1970s and 1980s, and
sometimes made it difficult for observers to credit the accomplishments of their
ideological rivals. This essay will consider the problematic nature of the term
“amateur,” the differences in rules between professional and amateur hockey,
the changes that brought the rules of the amateur International Ice Hockey
Federation (IIHF) closer to those of the professional National Hockey League
(NHL), and the assessment of amateur and professional hockey made possible
by historic competitions such as the 1972 Canada-USSR Summit Series, the
1974 Canada-USSR series, the 1975–76 Super Series, Canada Cup tournaments
between 1976 and 1987, and the 1979 Challenge Cup. It will conclude with
some observations about the comparative merits of skill and physicality in
hockey, and professional rules that discourage skilled play.

I. AMATEURISM: A DEFINITIONAL PROBLEM
As competitors have long understood, the very definition of “amateur”
poses problems. Historians Matthew Llewelyn and John Gleaves demonstrate in
The Rise and Fall of Olympic Amateurism that the concept was difficult to
define, inconsistent across sports and time periods, and promoted hypocrisy in
almost any situation where competition was limited to amateurs.3 A case in
point: for most of the Cold War, Olympic athletes and those competing in world
championships run by international federations were required to be amateurs. To

2
This essay builds on the author’s earlier works on Cold War hockey, including: John Soares, Cold
War, Hot Ice: International Ice Hockey, 1947-1980, 34 J. SPORT HIST. 207 (2007) [hereinafter Soares,
Cold War, Hot Ice]; John Soares, Difficult to Draw a Balance Sheet: Ottawa Views the 1974 CanadaUSSR Hockey Series, COLD WAR INT’L HIST. PROJECT WORKING PAPER SERIES, Feb. 2014, at 1
[hereinafter Soares, Difficult to Draw]; John Soares, East Beats West: Ice Hockey and the Cold War, in
SPORT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF MODERN EUROPE: STATES, MEDIA AND MARKETS, 1950-2010, at
35 (Alan Tomlinson et al. eds., 2011); John Soares, Hockey Diplomacy and U.S.-Canadian Relations in
the Early Trudeau Years, 40 DIPLOMATIC HIST. 810 (2016) [hereinafter Soares, Hockey Diplomacy];
John Soares, “Our Way of Life Against Theirs”: Ice Hockey and the Cold War, in DIPLOMATIC GAMES:
SPORT, STATECRAFT, AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SINCE 1945, at 251 (Heather L. Dichter &
Andrew L. Johns eds., 2014) [hereinafter Soares, Our Way of Life]; John Soares, ‘Very Correct
Adversaries’: The Cold War on Ice from 1947 to the Squaw Valley Olympics, 30 INT’L J. HIST. SPORT
1536 (2013) [hereinafter Soares, Very Correct Adversaries].
3
MATTHEW P. LLEWELLYN & JOHN GLEAVES, THE RISE AND FALL OF OLYMPIC AMATEURISM
(Randy Roberts et al. eds., 2016).
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circumvent these requirements, athletes in Cold War-era Communist countries
that practiced full-time, year-round, and received among the most generous
compensation packages in those societies, claimed amateur status because they
were nominally defined as army officers, graduate students, tradesmen, or
practitioners of some other occupation.4 In hockey, the pursuit of some other
vocation was crucial to Communist explanations of the differences between
amateurs and professionals. The Soviets argued that “[m]ost of our players are
in higher education institutes and colleges or in the military.”5 They claimed that
Canadian players focused solely on hockey, while “Soviet ice hockey players
ha[d] a rich spiritual life,” and opportunities for “higher education and [to]
acquire useful professions.”6 In addition, the Soviets believed Canadian hockey
professionals often embraced the shallowest form of physical exploitation: the
Soviets thought Canadian hockey professionals would “deliberately initiate
fights in order to entertain their spectators.”7
Despite Soviet claims, it was public knowledge, early on, inside the USSR
and out, that Soviet athletes were in fact well compensated for full-time
training—professionals by any honest reckoning. In 1954, U.S. News & World
Report showed a cartoon from a Soviet satire magazine depicting an office
where all employees had two titles on the name plate at their desk: a position in
the firm and a position on the football (soccer) team. The panel also showed that
only the chief bookkeeper was at work while the other employees could be seen
through an office window, out practicing on the pitch.8 Nor was this approach
limited to the Soviet Union. In 1954, the U.S. embassy in Prague reported that
Czechoslovakia’s elite athletes were usually conscripted into the army, where
“they live like race horses” and have “nothing to do but eat and train.”9
4
See YURI BROKHIN, THE BIG RED MACHINE: THE RISE AND FALL OF SOVIET OLYMPIC CHAMPIONS
(1978); JAMES RIORDAN, SPORT IN SOVIET SOCIETY: DEVELOPMENT OF SPORT AND PHYSICAL
EDUCATION IN RUSSIA AND THE USSR (1977); and ANATOLI TARASOV, ROAD TO OLYMPUS (1972), for
more on the Soviet sports system. See also Robert F. Baumann, The Central Army Sports Club (TsSKA):
Forging a Military Tradition in Soviet Ice Hockey, 15 J. SPORT HIST. 151 (1988) (discussing Soviet
hockey specifically); Jenifer Parks, Verbal Gymnastics: Sports, Bureaucracy, and the Soviet Union’s
Entrance into the Olympic Games, 1946–1952, in EAST PLAYS WEST: SPORT AND THE COLD WAR 27
(Stephen Wagg & David L. Andrews eds., 2007); Jim Riordan, Playing to New Rules: Soviet Sport and
Perestrokia, 42 SOVIET STUD. 133 (1990); James Riordan, Soviet Sport and Soviet Foreign Policy, 26
SOVIET STUD. 322 (1974); Jim Riordan, The Rise and Fall of Soviet Olympic Champions, 2 OLYMPIKA
25 (1993); Jim Riordan, The Role of Sport in Soviet Foreign Policy, 43 INT’L J. 569 (1988).
5
Don Ramsey, Soviet Official Denies Players Pros as Finns Trounced, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto),
Sept. 8, 1976, at S2 (quoting Soviet hockey official Viktor Kotoshkin).
6
Memorandum from Canadian Embassy, Moscow, to the Under-Sec’y of State for External Affairs
(Oct. 5, 1972) (on file with Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, No. 626, RG25, vol. 10921) (including
translation of newspaper article Comments on Ice Hockey Matches Between U.S.S.R. and Canada, dated
Sept. 30, 1972, from Russian news agency TASS).
7
Telex Message from Canadian Embassy, Moscow, to the Under-Sec’y of State for External Affairs
(Jan. 30, 1970) (on file with Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, No. 101, RG29, vol. 2176) (translating
newspaper article Разве это хоккей? Полемические заметки [Is This Hockey? Polemical Notes], from
Soviet children’s newspaper КОМСОМЛЬСКАЯ ПРАВДА [KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA]).
8
Reds Hope to Rule Sports, Too: 12 Million Athletes in Training to Beat the Best, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Aug. 20, 1954, at 36 (featuring a cartoon “Men at ‘Work,’” originally published in Soviet
satirical magazine Krokodil); see also Avery Brundage Book – Russian Sports Book 1954, (on file with
the University of Illinois Archives, Urbana, IL, in the Avery Brundage Collection) (noting the
significance of the Krokodil cartoon found in Avery Brundage’s files).
9
Foreign Service Dispatch from HICOG Frankfurt to Dep’t of State (Jan. 28, 1954) (on file with
United States National Archives, College Park, MD, No. 2009, at 860.453/1-2854, Box 5145A, RG59,
State Department Central Decimal Files, 1950–54).
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It was not just the Communist nations that found ways to keep their best
players classified as amateurs. In Sweden and Finland, company teams were the
favored device for doing this. Prior to the mid-1970s, when the top Swedes and
Finns began coming to North America to play professionally in significant
numbers, virtually all of the best Swedes and Finns played in their own
countries, and were classified as amateurs.10
In fact, the only nations that were open about the professionalism of their
best players were the United States and Canada.11 And this mattered little for the
United States: in the years before NHL expansion began in 1967, rosters of
professional teams in the NHL and minor leagues were almost entirely
Canadian. When American Tommy Williams broke into the NHL in early 1962,
he was the only non-Canadian in the entire league.12 With NHL expansion that
began in 1967, even more Canadians turned professional, and became ineligible
for the Olympics and world tournaments. According to Hockey Canada’s
president, in 1970, 639 (out of 654 total) professional hockey players were
Canadians.13 The situation for Canadian amateur hockey would worsen further
with the 1972 establishment of the World Hockey Association (WHA), a
professional league with teams in Canada and the United States that intended to
rival the NHL.
Canadians were unhappy about losing international competitions in their
national game with such basic unfairness working against them. In dealing with
this, Canadian diplomats and hockey officials worked hard to promote changes
in international rules; the Canadians, in particular, wanted the IIHF to open its
world championships to professionals. The efforts of these hockey and
diplomatic officials gave rise to the unprecedented international competitions in
the 1970s described below. In the short term, though, displeased by the
unfairness of the amateurism issue, Canada withdrew from Olympic and world
championship hockey from 1970 through 1976.14
One of those who recognized the unfairness in the IIHF’s amateur rules was
long-time International Olympic Committee (IOC) president Avery Brundage.15
Brundage was a proponent of the pure strain of amateurism he had exhibited in
his own days as a competitive athlete, which culminated at the 1912 Olympics
in Stockholm. Brundage had long believed that hockey was too commercialized
to ever comply with his strict vision of amateurism; trying to prove his point, in
1948 he triggered a showdown over the eligibility of U.S. hockey players that
included rival teams showing up in St. Moritz claiming to represent the United
States, a threatened boycott, and near cancellation of those Winter Games.16 In
1970, Brundage wrote that “it seem[ed] ridiculous to bar the Canadians from the

10

Soares, Our Way of Life, supra note 2, at 261.
Id. at 260 & 287 n.40.
12
Williams Only U.S. Citizen in Ranks of NHL, BOS. GLOBE, Jan. 28, 1962, at C56.
13
Charles Hay, President Hockey Can., address to the Calgary Chamber of Commerce (Mar. 4, 1970)
(on file with the University of Illinois Archives, Urbana, IL, in the Avery Brundage Collection, Box 119).
14
Soares, Our Way of Life, supra note 2, at 261–64, 289 n.51.
15
See LLEWELYN & GLEAVES, supra note 3; see also ALLEN GUTTMANN, THE GAMES MUST GO ON:
AVERY BRUNDAGE AND THE OLYMPIC MOVEMENT (1984) for an excellent biography.
16
See Gordon MacDonald, A Colossal Embroglio: Control of Amateur Ice Hockey in the United
States and the 1948 Winter Games, 7 OLYMPIKA 43 (1998); Soares, Very Correct Adversaries, supra note
2, at 1537–39.
11
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World’s Championships and permit” other world hockey powers to compete.17
In some ways, though, sports officials were consistent. Hockey officials in many
countries did not complain if Canada was represented in international
competitions by players with prior professional experience, as long as they had
been “reamateurized” before the tournament. For example, at the 1958 World
Hockey Championships, Canada was represented by a team that included fifteen
former professionals on its seventeen-man roster!18 National hockey officials
did not challenge each other’s definition of who or what was amateur, and they
were not about to challenge Canada if its Olympic or world tournament players
had professional experience—as long as those players were identified as amateur
in time for the competition.19
Amateurism, then, included a significant dose of arbitrariness and
unfairness, if not downright hypocrisy; many of the purported amateurs should
have been classified as professionals. However, despite their uniformly high
level of play, there were substantial differences between the two schools of
hockey: North American professionals and international amateurs developed
different rules, and consequently very different styles of play.

II. DIFFERENCES IN PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR RULES

The single biggest factor shaping the different development of amateur and
professional hockey was World War II. After 1939, there were no Olympic or
world (or even European) championship tournaments until 1947, and Canada
missed that event.20 Thus, for close to a decade there was no meaningful contact
among serious hockey players from North America and Europe.
Developments in professional hockey were significant even for North
American amateurs because many amateur leagues there followed NHL rules.21
Even those who did not, like the American collegiate and high school circuits,
still tended to play a more physical game, on a smaller ice surface, than the
Europeans.22 Canadians, whose amateur rules closely followed the NHL, played
a much more physical and sometimes combative game, even when they were
amateurs competing under international rules.23 The differences between the two
games became so pronounced that by the early 1950s there were suggestions in

17
Letter from Avery Brundage to Severin Lovenskiold (Apr. 2, 1970) (on file with the University of
Illinois Archives, Urbana, IL, in the Avery Brundage Collection, Box 216).
18
Telegram from STKHM to EXTER (Dec. 12, 1969) (on file with Library and Archives Canada,
Ottawa, No. 812, RG29, vol. 2176).
19
See Soares, Our Way of Life, supra note 2, at 260–64.
20
TOMASZ MALOLEPSZY, EUROPEAN ICE HOCKEY CHAMPIONSHIP RESULTS: SINCE 1910, at 54–55
(2013).
21
Soares, Very Correct Adversaries, supra note 2, at 1545.
22
Id.
23
Soares, Our Way of Life, supra note 2, at 267.
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Europe that local federations establish a “European school of hockey ‘even at
the expense of severing relations with the U.S. and Canadian teams.’”24
The differences in the European amateur and North American professional
versions of the sport were attributable to rule differences that appear small at
first glance, but had significant impact on play. The most important variation
was the size of the ice surface—a difference which persists today, despite the
convergence of the amateur and professional games in other respects.25 Hockey
rinks in Europe, at most Olympic sites, and even at some U.S. facilities, use
Olympic-sized ice sheets that are 100 feet wide—15 feet wider than NHLregulation ice.26 This difference sounds small, but ice sheets are 200 feet long,
so those 15 additional feet translate to 300 square feet of added ice surface. This
in turn means much more space for stickhandling, making it difficult for teams
to play any of the various “trap” or “lock” defensive systems designed to clog
the neutral zone that have often been popular in professional hockey.27 The
added space also creates very different angles for passing, and more
opportunities for players to either pass or keep possession of the puck, rather
than dumping the puck up the ice and hoping a teammate can retrieve it. In fact,
Soviet hockey teams tabulated the number of passes by each squad in a game—
a practice that would have been unusual in North America.28
Perhaps the most significant rules difference concerned body-checking,
which was long limited to the defensive zone in international amateur hockey
but unrestricted among North American professionals. In 1969, IIHF rules were
changed to permit body-checking in all three zones.29 All-zone body-checking
in professional hockey has meant that a common strategy used by the team in
possession of the puck is to shoot it into the offensive zone, giving away
possession of the puck but hoping to “establish a forecheck” and reclaim it when
in a better scoring position.30 This approach is commonly called “dump and
chase” because it promotes frequent collisions (Washington, D.C. lawyer Stuart
Feldstein has referred to it as “NASCAR hockey.”)31
“Dump and chase” can be an effective strategy when body-checking in the
offensive zone is permitted, but it makes little sense when it is prohibited. In that
case, a forward dumping the puck into the offensive zone is merely racing the
opposing team’s defensemen to the puck, often in cases where one of the
defenseman has a head start. This, however, did not stop some North American
teams from using this approach during the IIHF’s era of restricted body-

24
Foreign Service Dispatch from Oslo to Dep’t of State (Apr. 29, 1953) (on file with the United
States National Archives, College Park, MD, No. 962 at 857.4533/4-2953, Box 5116, RG59, State
Department Central Decimal Files, 1950–54).
25
Soares, Very Correct Adversaries, supra note 2, at 1545 & 1551 n.75.
26
Id.
27
See TARASOV, supra note 4 (detailing the number of passes by the two teams in a number of
Olympic and world championship games).
28
Id.
29
International Hockey Timeline, INT’L ICE HOCKEY FED’N, http://www.iihf.com/iihfhome/history/the-iihf/timeline/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2017).
30
Soares, Difficult to Draw, supra note 2, at 5.
31
Mr. Feldstein used the phrase in a conversation with the author during years in which Mr. Feldstein
was a senior partner, and the author was a legal assistant and law librarian at a firm then known as
Fleischman and Walsh.
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checking, which in turn tended to produce more body contact and physical play
than a puck-possession approach.32
A factor that compounded the differences between the professional and
amateur games was the distinctive Soviet style which varied not only by the
number of passes, but the extreme selectivity in taking shots.33 Professional
teams, and their imitators in North America, often liked to “get the puck to the
net” in the hopes that a redirection or rebound would lead to a quality scoring
chance, even against an excellent goaltender. By contrast, the Soviet amateurs
shot the puck far less frequently.34 In addition to tracking the number of passes
each team made, the Soviets also calculated shooting percentage—a statistical
category that would have seemed pointless to most professionals.35 As a result
of the “extra” passes Soviet amateurs made, the rhythm and flow of their offense
was very different from that of professionals. This was particularly noticeable
when a Canadian professional goaltender first played against Soviet amateurs;
the goaltender would anticipate professional style passing, and position himself
accordingly, only to be surprised by the amateurs’ extra passing.36 After the
additional pass or passes, the goaltender would be out of position and the
amateurs could simply shoot the puck into an empty, undefended net.
In addition to the differences in body-checking and offensive styles, the
amateur and professional games also had important differences in the rules
concerning penalties. Most infractions are “minor penalties,” which gets a player
sent to the penalty box for two minutes while the opposing team plays with a
manpower advantage—on the “power play,” in hockey parlance.37 Into the
1960s international rules required a player assessed with a minor penalty to serve
the full two minutes in all circumstances, while a professional player charged
with a minor penalty could return to the game as soon as the other team scored
a goal on the power play. The NHL adopted this rule because the dominant
Montreal Canadiens team was scoring so many power play goals when given the
full two minutes, that just one or two power plays per game could enable them
to build an insurmountable lead.38 In addition, amateur hockey did not change
the “icing” rule for a team short-handed because of a penalty, while professional
hockey permitted short-handed teams to ice the puck.39 These two rule
differences made penalties significantly less punitive in professional hockey.
Consequently, professional hockey, and its amateur imitators in North
America, developed a version of the sport that was more violent, more
32

Soares, Difficult to Draw, supra note 2, at 5.
See Soares, East Beats West, supra note 2, at 38 (“[Soviet] teams emphasized passing, puck
possession, and selectivity in taking shots only when there was a good chance of scoring.”).
34
Id.
35
See TARASOV, supra note 4, at 175, 192–93 (noting the tabulation of the number of passes, Tarasov
mentions the percentage of shots scored in certain international contests); see also Frank Orr, Canada
Victim of Bad Manners When Prizes Given, TORONTO STAR, Dec. 27, 1987, at D2 (showing how
Canadian observers were sometimes bewildered by the number of statistical categories Soviet hockey
officials tracked).
36
See TARASOV, supra note 4, at 98–99.
37
INT’L ICE HOCKEY FED’N, IIHF OFFICIAL RULE BOOK 2014-2018, at 69 (2d ed. 2015).
38
JAMES DUPLACEY, THE ANNOTATED RULES OF HOCKEY: AN OFFICIAL PUBLICATION OF THE
NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE 56–57, (Dan Diamond eds., 1996).
39
INT’L ICE HOCKEY FED’N, supra note 37, at 47–48. “Icing” is an infraction that occurs when a team
shoots the puck from its side of center ice, across the opposing team’s goal line. When a team is called
for icing, play is halted and resumed after a faceoff in the offending team’s zone.
33
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physical, and in important ways placed less value on skill than did the amateur
version of the game common in Europe.40 Differences in play persisted even
after IIHF rules changes that brought the amateur and professional games
closer together.

III. CHANGES TO THE IIHF RULES

International rule changes occurred at about the same time that Canadian
hockey officials—with diplomatic support from the foreign ministry in
Ottawa—finally began to have success in breaking down barriers to competition
between the best Canadian professionals and the top European amateurs.41 In
addition to the difference in rules between the amateur and professional games,
the IOC, into the 1970s, opposed contests between amateurs and professionals
in a stringent interpretation of amateurism which held that mere competition
against professionals “contaminated” amateurs. This philosophy had its roots in
late nineteenth and early twentieth-century amateurism, which prohibited
amateurs from competing in events where professionals were welcome,
admission fees were charged, or cash prizes were offered—even if they refused
to accept any cash prizes themselves.42 Although amateur sports authorities had
relaxed many of these strictures by the mid-twentieth century, the view that
competition against professionals “contaminated” amateurs was promoted into
the 1970s by IOC head Brundage.
These restrictions on amateurs caused frustration in Canada and the USSR.
Not only were hundreds of the best Canadians excluded from Olympic and world
championship tournaments, with such an interpretation of amateurism there was
no way to arrange even exhibition games between NHL players and the best
Soviets, which might have enabled Canada to reclaim international prestige.43
This also frustrated the Soviets, who valued sports competitions—and
victories—against the best of the capitalists. But they attached particular
importance to the Olympics, and were unwilling to jeopardize their top players’
amateur status with exhibition contests, and thus were unable to play against the
best Canadians.44
An important convergence between the professional and amateur games
occurred when the IIHF eliminated its zonal restrictions on body-checking in
1969.45 Prior to that change, as part of his effort to encourage competitions
between the best Russians and Canadians, Anatoli Tarasov, the architect of
Soviet hockey power, had been dismissive of the different rules on bodychecking. For years Tarasov was co-coach of the Soviet national team, along
with Arkady Chernyashev; Tarasov also served as coach of Moscow’s Central
40
Soares, Very Correct Adversaries, supra note 2, at 1545; see also Soares, Difficult to Draw, supra
note 2, at 5.
41
Soares, Difficult to Draw, supra note 2, at 10–13.
42
RONALD A. SMITH, SPORTS & FREEDOM: THE RISE OF BIG-TIME COLLEGE ATHLETICS 165–72
(1988).
43
See Soares, Cold War, Hot Ice, supra note 2, at 217.
44
Id.
45
International Hockey Timeline, supra note 29.
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Army club in the Russian elite league.46 In his book about the building of the
Soviet program, Road to Olympus, Tarasov gleefully described a 1962
exhibition game against the Hamilton Red Wings, one of Canada’s major “junior
amateur” clubs for top teenaged boys.47 In Tarasov’s telling, the Hamilton club
had been “reinforced with nine professionals, whose game was obviously hard
hitting and rough,” and it attempted to intimidate the Soviets with rough play.
Despite the Hamilton players’ hooliganism, no penalties were called. After the
first period, the Soviet coaches told their players to hit the Red Wings hard, but
within the rules. The clean, hard Soviet hits injured several Red Wings. At the
second intermission, the Hamilton coaches pleaded with the Soviets, offering to
abandon the rough play if the Soviets agreed to end their punishing (but legal)
body-checking, so that both teams could play a “clean and honest game.” On
those terms, the game was finished.48 The moral of Tarasov’s story was simple:
the Canadians could not intimidate the Soviets with violence and pugnacity.
Tarasov made his dismissiveness of rough play explicit in a challenge to the
Canadian professionals, which was reported by the Toronto Daily Star.49 The
Star explained that Tarasov said the Soviets were “not afraid of playing by the
rougher professional rules,” and it quoted Tarasov saying, “We . . . assure you
that our boys will be able to knock the eagerness for rough-housing out of
anybody who tries to play rough against a Soviet hockey team.”50
A one-time exhibition, though, was a different matter than the IIHF adopting
professional rules. After playing against Canadians under the changed bodychecking rules, Tarasov argued that “body-checking throughout the [ice] is
harmful for amateur hockey” because it “constitute[d] a license for borrowing
some elements from fencing, wrestling and boxing.”51 A coach, Tarasov
believed, should encourage his players to develop “chivalry and nobility,” but
the adoption of professional-style rules for amateurs instead promoted “open
brutality” and the overwhelming of skilled play by “incessantly
initiated . . . attacks and fights.”52
Tarasov’s concerns about the brutality of professional hockey would be
echoed frequently when hockey entered a new era of amateur vs. professional
competition in the 1970s.

46

Baumann, supra note 4, at 157; TARASOV, supra note 4, at 81.
See TARASOV, supra note 4, at 160–63. The author has been unable to independently confirm some
of these details provided by Tarasov in Road to Olympus. The presence of nine “professionals” would
have been significant because with 20-man rosters, the majority of the Hamilton club would have
remained amateur, thus enabling the Soviets to claim they had played against an amateur team and not
forfeited their amateur status.
48
Id.
49
Pride or Cowardice? Russians Challenge the Pros Once More, TORONTO DAILY STAR, Jan. 11,
1969, at 62.
50
Id.
51
Telex Message from Canadian Embassy, Moscow, to the Under-Sec’y of State for External Affairs,
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IV. AMATEURS VS. PROFESSIONALS IN THE 1970S AND 1980S
The IIHF’s rule changes brought professional and amateur hockey closer
together in their rules, but did not immediately alter the different playing
styles—nor did they change the way referees called penalties.53 European
players emphasized puck possession and accurate passing, whereas Canadians
(and Americans) still usually emphasized physical play, and referees’
approaches were shaped by the system in which they had learned the game.54
Many international competitions ended with coaches, players and journalists
lamenting officiating: Canadian referees’ tolerance of apparent rules violations
drew European complaints, while Canadians protested that European referees
called far too many penalties.55 These arguments began under the old IIHF rules,
and continued in the new era of professionals and amateurs playing head-to-head
competitions.
These competitions began with the Summit Series in September 1972. Team
Canada, a collection of NHL all-stars, played an eight-game series with the
Soviet national team: four in Canada, followed by a two-week break during
which the teams travelled to Europe and acclimated themselves to the time
difference and the larger ice surface, then four games in Moscow’s Luzhniki
arena.56
Although players who had jumped to the new WHA, like Bobby Hull and
Gerry Cheevers, were excluded, Team Canada was loaded with top-drawer
professional talent.57 Matched up against the Soviet amateurs, their countrymen
expected them to restore Canada’s claim as the world’s most powerful hockey
nation. Pundits routinely predicted the professionals would win all eight games,
and seldom would a Canadian prognosticator pick the amateurs to win more than
one.58
It is worth emphasizing how inferior the amateur game appeared. The
Soviets’ unprecedented run of dominance in Olympic and world championship
hockey since 1963 took place against amateur competition that players, coaches,
executives, journalists and fans of professional hockey considered, with good
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reason, vastly inferior to the professionals.59 Not only were so many Canadians
ineligible for Olympic and world championship hockey, there were few
indications that the best European amateurs could successfully compete against
the professionals. Swedes and Finns did not begin appearing in North American
professional leagues in any numbers until later in the 1970s. Prior to 1972, only
three Swedes had ever appeared in North American professional hockey, and
only one had a career of any length.60 When Czechoslovakia began permitting
national team stars who had turned thirty to play professionally in North
America, the first to do so was Jaroslav Jirik. Jirik was a legend of
Czechoslovakian hockey who had led his national league with thirty-six goals
in thirty-six regular season games in 1968–69.61 He signed with the St. Louis
Blues for the 1969–70 season, but spent most of it in the minors. Jirik did not
tally a single goal or assist in three games with the Blues, and returned to his
Czechoslovakian club after the season.62 Therefore, it was understandable that
expectations for the professionals going into the Summit Series were so high.
When the Summit Series opened in Montreal, it appeared to conform to
those expectations: the professionals scored in the first thirty seconds.63 Another
goal about six minutes into the game gave the professionals a 2-0 lead. But the
amateurs flipped the script and dominated the remainder of the contest,
outscoring the professionals, 7-1, to claim a 7-3 victory.64 While the amateurs
were well-conditioned and well-prepared for the series’ opening, the
professionals were nowhere near mid-season form. In addition, the amateurs had
been playing together whereas the professionals were a collection of all-stars,
many of whom had no prior experience playing with their linemates or defense
partners. On top of that, the professionals had difficulty adjusting to the Soviets’
very different style of play.65
After the shock of Game one, the professionals won Game two in Toronto.
But the teams tied Game three in Winnipeg. Game four saw the professionals
booed by fans in Vancouver when they were soundly outplayed and beaten by
the amateurs. When the series resumed in Moscow, the amateurs won Game
five, to take a commanding 3-1-1 lead in the series. Needing to win each of the
three remaining games in Moscow, the professionals did so, each by one goal.66
Paul Henderson became a national hero in Canada by notching each of the gamewinning tallies, scoring on a dramatic individual play with about two minutes
remaining in Game seven, and notching the series-clinching tally with just thirtyfour seconds remaining in Game eight.67
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In Canada, the professionals’ victory triggered celebrations. Canadian
humorist Will Ferguson reflected some of the Canadian mentality—which was
an important contributing factor to the professionals’ victory—when he later
recalled, “in ’72, we were the assholes. We were the bullies. We were the loudmouthed, winning-is-everything cretins. It was great.”68
But the series was very, very close. The amateurs had played the
professionals on even terms: Canada only won the series, 4-3-1. The Canadians
had not clinched the series until the final minute of the last game and the Soviets
actually outscored the Canadians over the course of the eight games. The world’s
top amateurs had demonstrated that their level of play was on par with the
world’s best professionals. Canadian novelist Mordecai Richler wrote, “After
the series, nothing was ever the same again in Canada. Beer didn’t taste as good.
The Rockies seemed smaller, the northern lights dimmer. Our last-minute win
came more in the nature of a relief than a triumph.”69 Goaltender Ken Dryden—
the one-time Cornell University all-American who took a law degree at McGill
University while starring for the Montreal Canadiens and played goaltender for
Team Canada in the series—later wrote, “Our birthright was suddenly at risk. It
was like being shot at and missed. We couldn’t forget how close it had been, and
could only worry that the next time would be different.”70
As humorist Ferguson’s comments suggested, part of the Canadians’ secret
in the victory had been their willingness to be “bullies” and “cretins,” and
embrace a “winning-is-everything” mentality. 71 One of the turning points in the
series was a Game six injury to Soviet star Valerii Kharlamov. Canada’s Bobby
Clarke—acting, it came out much later, at the suggestion of Canada’s assistant
coach—deliberately slashed the ankle of the Soviets’ most impressive star.72 The
injury dramatically reduced Kharlamov’s effectiveness for the rest of the series.
Of course, there were other contributing factors in Canada’s rally: they adapted
and adjusted to the Soviets’ game tactics, and the professionals played their way
into shape by the time the series got to Moscow. Still, the discomforting fact
remained that without resort to naked thuggery, the professionals might not have
won.
The strength of amateur hockey was on display again two years later when
the Soviet national team played a sequel series against Canadian professionals.
In 1974, the Soviets met the stars of the WHA. The WHA was able to lure some
of the NHL’s top players, including: long-time Chicago legend Bobby Hull;
Frank Mahovlich, who had been an important member of six Stanley Cup
championship teams in Toronto and Montreal; and Summit Series hero Paul
Henderson. On balance, though, the professional team that represented Canada
in 1974 was well below the quality of its predecessors from the ’72 Series; few
members of Team Canada ’74 would have made the squad if it had included the
best of all of Canada’s pros.
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The professionals in that ’74 Series managed just one win while the
amateurs won four games; three games ended in ties. The series was closer than
that final result indicates: heading into Game seven the professionals had a
chance to escape with a draw by winning the final two games.73 Still, there was
no escaping the fact that the ’74 Canada-USSR series was a clear victory for the
amateurs.
The amateurs again performed impressively when two teams from the
Soviet elite league toured North America in 1975–76 in the so-called Super
Series. Central Army and Krylia Sovyetov (“Wings of the Soviet”) each played
four games against NHL teams: Krylia beat the New York Islanders, Pittsburgh
Penguins and Chicago Black Hawks, and lost to the Buffalo Sabres. Army beat
the New York Rangers and Boston Bruins, tied the Montreal Canadiens in a
game sometimes considered the greatest ever played, and lost to the Philadelphia
Flyers.74 The loss to the Flyers was controversial: the Philadelphia club, known
as the “Broad Street Bullies” for their pugnacity, had won two consecutive
Stanley Cups. They played physically against the Soviets, and the North
American referee gave the Flyers wide latitude for rough play without assessing
penalties.75 Venerable New York Times columnist Dave Anderson complained
that “[t]he triumph of terror over style could not have been more one-sided if Al
Capone’s mob had ambushed the Bolshoi Ballet dancers.”76 At one point in the
first period Army withdrew from the ice and threatened to quit, but was
convinced to return. Army appeared unenthusiastic, though: this was the final
game of the Super Series, the Soviets clubs had already clinched “victory” in the
series, and the Soviet coach feared injuries to any of the players who would be
the nucleus of the USSR’s team at the February 1976 Olympics in Innsbruck.77
As that quick tally of results indicated, in the eight-series games, the amateur
clubs won five and tied one; only two professional teams prevailed. A closer
look reveals some important nuances: the two NHL teams that beat Soviet
amateur clubs, Buffalo and Philadelphia, had met in the previous spring’s
Stanley Cup Final, and both beat their Soviet opponents by a substantial margin.
The Flyers’ 4-1 win over the Army can be explained in part by the
circumstances, but Buffalo’s 12-6 win over Moscow’s Wings was a decisive
thrashing. In addition, the NHL team that tied the amateurs, Montreal, would
win its first of four straight Stanley Cups in spring 1976. In other words, the
amateurs struggled against the very best professionals. Otherwise, though, they
had considerable success.
Still, one should not overstate the significance of these wins: Army and
Krylia were strengthened by the addition of other Soviet elite league club
players, while the NHL teams that played the Soviets did not strengthen their
rosters by adding players from other NHL clubs. The very best Soviet players—
those who would represent the Soviets at Innsbruck—appeared in the Super
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Series. Many of the very best Canadian professionals, though, played on NHL
(or WHA) teams that did not even play against the Russians.
Bobby Clarke’s slash of Valerii Kharlamov in the Summit Series, and the
controversy surrounding the Flyers-Soviets game in the Super Series,
demonstrate that there were times when the professionals resorted to what the
Soviets derided as “rough play” or “animal hockey.” This led to sometimes
overwrought prose in the West complaining about Canadians “hacking and
clubbing the Soviet players like seal pups.”78 But one should not conclude that
the professionals had a monopoly on violence, rules violations, and lenient
officiating. The Soviets were not mere innocents; they did, however, try to
conceal their cheap shots. Flyers player “Battleship Bob” Kelly contrasted the
Russian style with the open Canadian willingness to fight; after the Super Series
meeting with the Russians, Kelly said of the Russians, “All they do is spear you,
hook you, kick you.”79 During the Flyers-Army game, a Russian player’s stick
clipped Bobby Clarke on the head, sending blood flowing down the side of his
face.80 After the Boston-Army game in the Super Series, Boston Globe
columnist Martin Nolan described a sequence in which Army captain “Boris
Mikhailov shoved, kicked and mugged Bruin goaltender Gilles Gilbert, even
knocking away his stick, in apparent violation of the Geneva Convention, the
Marquis of Queensbury rules, and the United Nations Charter.” Despite
Mikhailov’s behavior, the Soviet referee did not assess him a penalty. Nolan
noted that the Soviets’ discipline “did not preclude dirty play. The difference
was—just as in the game of international diplomacy—they were seldom caught
at it.”81
The Canadian ambassador even reported home, with obvious frustration,
about bad behavior by players in Soviet elite league hockey games. Shortly after
the 1974 Canada-USSR series, during and after which the Soviets complained
bitterly about Canadian players’ conduct, the Canadian ambassador reported to
Ottawa that in a league game a Soviet player had threatened an official with his
stick, and the ambassador reported the official “did not consider the raised stick
as simply a gesture, but as a real threat.” Yet this event “received no publicity
in the Soviet press,” indicating the “hypocrisy of the Soviet attacks on Canada’s
dirty style of hockey.”82
While neither side could claim a monopoly on virtuous play, the initial
competitions between professionals and amateurs indicated that the best
amateurs could more than hold their own against the top professionals when it
came to skill level and results. And amateur hockey received a further boost later
in 1976. Amateurs and professionals from the six best hockey playing counties
participated in the inaugural Canada Cup, the forerunner of today’s World Cup
of Hockey. The organizers of the Canada Cup imposed no restrictions on rosters:
players could be professional or amateur, and it did not matter in what league
78
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they regularly played. Team Canada won the first Canada Cup, playing with a
squad widely regarded as Canada’s finest ever—its roster was studded with no
fewer than twelve future Hall of Famers.83 After their experience against the
Flyers in the 1975–76 Super Series, the Soviets participated in that inaugural
Canada Cup with an experimental team, trying to develop a more physical and
robust group of players to match up with the professionals. That Soviet team
finished third, but its disappointment opened the way for another amateur
powerhouse: Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovakians were the reigning amateur
world champions. They inflicted Canada’s only loss in the Canada Cup
tournament, a 1-0 shutout during the preliminary round. Even though the
Canadian professionals subdued the Czechoslovakian amateurs in the finals to
win the Cup, the world’s amateur champions had managed to defeat the greatest
professional team assembled in the history of hockey. And, significantly,
because this was done by the Czechoslovakians, it demonstrated that the success
of amateur hockey was not limited to the USSR.
The strength of amateur hockey became even more embarrassingly clear to
the professionals in February 1979: the NHL abandoned its traditional all-star
game format and instead played a three-game series matching the NHL all-stars
against the Soviet national team. The NHL won Game one, and had a 4-2 lead
in the second period of Game two, but the Soviets rallied to force a decisive
Game three. In their series-clinching win, the Soviet amateurs embarrassed the
NHL professionals, shutting them out 6-0—with the Soviets playing their
backup goaltender!84
It got worse for the professionals in the Canada Cup in 1981. The amateur
Soviet team embarrassed the Canadian professionals, 8-1, while winning the
second Canada Cup.85 Canada rebounded and won the Canada Cup again in
1984, but the strength of Soviet amateurs was on display in 1987, even though
Canada prevailed over them in the best-of-three final. Each of the three finals
games ended in a 6-5 final score. Canada lost the first, in overtime, then needed
two overtimes to win the second game, and clinched the Canada Cup in the final
two minutes of the third game.86 Canada was led to victory by all-time greats:
Wayne Gretzky, Mario Lemieux, and Mark Messier. Some of the greatest
professionals in history were barely able to escape with a victory over the
world’s top amateurs.87
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CONCLUSION: THE SUPERIORITY OF SKILL OVER PUGNACITY

The 1987 Canada Cup was a fitting demonstration of the relative merits of
amateur and professional hockey in the 1970s and 1980s: in the end, the best
professionals could usually find a way to prevail over the top amateurs but it
sometimes took a heroic effort by some of the very best professionals, playing
at the top of their game. Moreover, as was demonstrated by the slash of Valerii
Kharlamov’s ankle in the 1972 Summit Series, sometimes a professional victory
had less to do with superior skill and more with the professionals’ willingness
to go to extravagant lengths to win. As University of California historian Yuri
Slezkine has observed, the Russian amateurs might have done even better had
they been willing to break their opponents’ ankles.88
This points to a larger conclusion about amateur hockey: it could be more
skilled than the professional version of the game. Significantly, the Soviet Union
was not the only nation playing a creative, puck possession style of play. Fellow
Communist nation Czechoslovakia, as well as European democracies like
Sweden, Finland and West Germany, played styles much closer to the Soviets
than to the Canadians. The 1980 U.S. Olympic team that won a stunning gold
medal also played a style that Coach Herb Brooks described as throwing the
Soviets’ “game right back at them.”89 Significantly, that 1980 team is the only
U.S. men’s hockey squad since 1960 to win an Olympic gold medal. The
professional all-stars who represented the United States at every Olympics from
1998 through 2014 could not match the performance of the amateurs Brooks
coached at Lake Placid.
Because of the combative nature of North American professional hockey,
and the success that intimidation and brutality can play in helping teams win,
among North American hockey players, coaches, executives, and fans, the sport
has long had a cult celebrating toughness and pugnacity as a reliable way of
winning hockey. There are understandable historical reasons for this line of
thinking: legendary figures and teams have won championships employing what
Stephen Brunt called “toughness bordering on belligerence.”90 Conn Smythe, a
veteran of both world wars and the long-time owner of the Toronto Maple Leafs,
was famous for his dictum, “If you can’t beat them out in the alley”—i.e., in a
street fight—“you can’t beat them in here on the ice.”91 After the Soviets won
the first-ever USSR-Canada meeting at an IIHF world tournament, Smythe
suggested he might take his Maple Leafs to Russia later that year to play the
Soviets. Canadian diplomats considering the possibility noted New York
Ranger’s Coach Frank Boucher’s comment, “If Canada wants to take
responsibility for starting a third world war I can see no surer way than sending
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Smythe to Moscow with a hockey team.”92 Under Smythe’s ownership, the
Maple Leafs won seven Stanley Cups as the NHL’s playoff champions.
It was not just Smythe’s Maple Leafs. Boston’s Big Bad Bruins became a
league power in the late 1960s and won Stanley Cups in 1970 and 1972 while
they were “the league’s most feared intimidators, despised by opponents for their
rough, dirty play, called out by sensitive sportswriters for despoiling the
beautiful game of their youth.”93 Heirs to the Bruins’ reputation as feared
intimidators, the Philadelphia Flyers won back-to-back Stanley Cups in the mid1970s while taking belligerence to remarkable new levels. During “the three
seasons between 1969 and 1972 that would mark the peak of the Big Bad Bruins
. . . the team’s individual penalty leaders totaled 125, 132, and 141 minutes
respectively,”94 but the Flyers were headlined by brawlers like Dave “The
Hammer” Schultz, who tallied 348 and 472 penalty minutes during the Flyers’
1974 and 1975 Stanley Cups victories.95
As these teams demonstrated, toughness and pugnacity can help win games
and championships. Toughness is obviously essential in a game with bodychecking, where the law of the jungle often prevails around the goal, and where
certain teams and players try to take advantage of the fact that referees will not
call every infraction, either because it would kill the game’s flow or because
they prefer to “let the boys play.” Despite this, a wealth of evidence
demonstrates that skill matters more than pugnacity in determining hockey
championships.
Start with the Summit Series: the injury to Kharlamov damaged the Soviets’
chances, but Canada prevailed in the end because of the great play of its stars—
stars like Paul Henderson, who tallied seven goals in the eight-game series, or
Phil Esposito, whose thirteen points led all scorers in the series. Entering the
third period of the decisive Game eight, with Canada trailing 5-3, Esposito
scored Canada’s fourth goal, then assisted on Yvon Cournoyer’s game-tying
goal, and Henderson’s series-clincher. For all the controversy surrounding his
slash on Kharlamov, Clarke’s six points were Canada’s third-highest total,
trailing only Esposito and Henderson.
High skill was also a crucial component of the championships won by the
Toronto Maple Leafs, Boston Bruins, and the Philadelphia Flyers. Toronto’s
Cup wins were led by some of the game’s all-time greats, including Charlie
Conacher, Teeder Kennedy, Red Kelly, Dave Keon, Johnny Bower, and Terry
Sawchuck. Boston’s 1970 and 1972 Cup champions were led by Bobby Orr and
Phil Esposito. Orr won eight—eight—straight Norris trophies as the NHL’s best
defenseman. He also won three scoring titles and had single seasons with as
many as forty-six goals or 102 assists, despite playing defense. Esposito was a
five-time league scoring champion, who had four sixty-goal seasons, including
one in which he scored seventy-six. Boston’s Johnny Bucyk and Ken Hodge
were also fifty-goal scorers. The 1970–71 Bruins were so offensively dominant
that they averaged more than five goals per game, and had the NHL’s top four
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scorers, and six of the top eight. Similarly, Philadelphia’s “Broad Street Bullies”
won because of the efforts of stars like sixty-goal scorer Reggie Leach, fiftygoal scorers Rick MacLeish and Bill Barber, forty-goal scorer Bill Flett, onehundred-point scorer and three-time NHL MVP Bobby Clarke, plus future Hallof-Fame goaltender Bernie Parent. Even Dave Schultz and Bob Kelly, The
Hammer and Battleship, hit the twenty-goal plateau that is recognized as the
measure of legitimate scorers.96
On top of all this, the success of combative teams also needs to be placed in
context. In the years that the NHL was a six-team league (1942–43 to 1966–67),
Toronto won nine Stanley Cups, plus a pair of Prince of Wales Trophies as
regular season champions. In those same years, the Montreal Canadiens,
sometimes dubbed the “Flying Frenchmen” because of their speed and skill,
claimed ten Stanley Cups, plus another dozen Prince of Wales Trophies. (These
were the Montreal Canadiens that were so dominant offensively the NHL
changed its rules to limit the number of power play goals a team could score.)
In other words, in those twenty-five seasons, the tough Toronto Maple Leafs
won eleven championships, and the fast-and-skilled Canadiens won twenty-two.
Not only that, the Canadiens continued their dominance into the era of
expansion: from 1967–68 through 1978–79, Montreal won eight Cups—twice
as many as the Bruins and Flyers combined. In those years, the Canadiens played
the Bruins in four playoff series and Montreal won them all, including the series
that eliminated Boston after the record-setting 1970–71 regular season. (This
was part of a stretch in which Montreal won eighteen straight playoff series over
Boston; in the most storied rivalry in NHL history, the Canadiens have defeated
the Bruins in twenty-five of thirty-four postseason meetings.) Those Canadiens
also took care of the “Broad Street Bullies” Flyers, sweeping them in the 1976
Stanley Cup Final, when Philadelphia was seeking its third straight Cup.97 Fans
of other teams could justifiably complain that these powerhouse Montreal
squads benefited from rules that unfairly permitted them to horde the NHL’s
very best French-Canadian players, but that is the point: it was the skill that was
most important in deciding championships.
Readers who prefer a more recent example of this should look to the 2016
World Cup of Hockey. U.S. officials left a number of America’s top scoring
stars home while building a “roster of hard-nosed players who were assigned to
slow down Canada.” The U.S. team went winless, losing to Canada 4-2, was
eliminated from contention for the medal round after just two games, and scored
just five goals total in the three games it played.98 Team North America, which
included young American and Canadian members, played a fast, skilled game,
and gave a more impressive accounting of themselves in the tournament than the
tough and experienced U.S. team.
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In considering North American professional hockey, one should pay
attention to the ways in which the rules effectively encourage rough play and
punish skill. This essay has already mentioned the NHL’s practice of rewarding
a team for taking a penalty by permitting it to ice the puck, and making penalties
less punitive by permitting a player who receives a minor penalty to return to the
game if his team surrenders a power play goal. Also fitting into this phenomenon
is the trapezoid behind each NHL net, limiting the area where goaltenders may
handle the puck. The trapezoid came about because of the frustrations less
skilled teams had at the hands of goaltenders with exceptional puck-handling
skills, especially long-time New Jersey Devils star Martin Brodeur.99 These
goaltenders could function like a third defenseman when an opposing team tried
to play “dump and chase.”100 Such a goaltender could skate well away from the
goal to retrieve the puck and pass it to a teammate to start the breakout play. The
trapezoid limits the area in which NHL goaltenders can use their stickhandling
abilities, effectively penalizing goaltenders for being skilled.101
This punishment of skill may be understandable given the tastes of North
American hockey fans: an April 2017 article in the Wall Street Journal reported
that minor league hockey in the United States has seen a significant decrease in
fighting in recent decades—that it has grown less violent—and that it has seen
an apparently corresponding decline in attendance. For example, in the East
Coast Hockey League, compared to about twenty years ago, the number of major
penalties for fighting is down by more than fifty percent and attendance is down
by twenty percent.102 Whatever their motivation, and however wise their
business model, for decades the men in charge of the NHL have embraced rules
that hinder more skilled players and teams. The end of the Cold War, the removal
of barriers to the best Russians and Czechoslovaks playing in the NHL, and the
opening of the Olympics to professionals, have made the costs of this less
obvious: no longer do North American professionals have to fear defeat and
political embarrassment at the hands of amateurs.
Still, as the amateurs’ strong showing against the best professionals
demonstrated in the 1970s and 1980s, the professional game is not necessarily
the most skilled approach. Fans, owners, players, coaches, and others involved
with hockey may prefer the professional game as it is, but a brand of the game
that places greater emphasis on skill could be cultivated if the hockey
community wanted it.
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